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This paper will assess the "quality of democracy" in India and
Bangladesh.It argues that the democratic successes and failures in these
twocountries are in large measure a function of the sociopolitical mi-
lieuwithin which the democratic transitions took place in both states. It
will also argue that despite a range of striking shortcomings India has
madesignificant progress in a number of arenas toward enhancing the
quality of its democracy. Bangladesh, on the other hand, has failed to
make similar progress. Instead, there is much evidence that suggests
that tne quality of democracy in Bangladesh is actually declining.
The proposition that the emergence of democracy in India is a legacy
of British colonialism has considerable scholarly as well as popular
appeal.I Perhaps the fact that India reigns as the world's largest democ-
racy contributes to this impression. Yet despite its wide appeal, that
Proposition is largely devoid of merit; indeed it is deeply flawed, as
even a quick survey of other British colonial bequests reveals. From a
historical standpoint. ample evidence can be adduced to show that Brit-
ishcolonial administrators did much to stultify the growth of democratic
Political forces and institutions in British India (which included much
of what today is Pakistan and Bangladesh). For example, during much
of the independence movement, the British authorities in India enforced
a series of draconian laws limiting press freedom, restricted the right of
free assembly, and most egregiously, sought to suppress the explicitly
liberal and democratic elements of the nationalist movement.
Furthermore, a comparison with other legatees of British colonial-
ism, whether in Africa, in other parts of Asia, elsewhere in South Asia,
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should lead one to scoff at suggestions of a benign contribution by
British imperialism to the growth of democracy. In SOUlhAsia, outside
of India democracy has failed 10 take deep root in any of the other stales
emergent from the detritus of the British Indian empire. In Pakistan, for
example, it has been brittle at best and nonexistent at worst. 2 In Sri
Lanka, it has involved institutionalized ethnic discrimination and con-
tributed to a seemingly unending ethnic civil war.'
In Bangladesh, democracy remains at best procedural. Bangladesh's
failure to consolidate and deepen democracy requires some explana-
tion. Once again. historical legacies are of extraordinary importance.
Bangladesh emerged as an independent state only in 1971 with the
break-up of Pakistan. From 1947 to 1971. what is loday Bangladesh was
the noncontiguous eastern wing of Pakistan. During this period it was
not only subject to the vagaries of Pakistan's turbulent politics and
long bouts of authoritarian and military rule, but was also treated mostly
as an internal colony. These years. which constituted the formative phase
of Bangladesh, shaped a number of its critical institutions, most notably
Ihe army. Unlike India, Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh failed to
establish firm civilian control over the military.' Long years of authori-
tarian military rule in Pakistan also contributed to an antidemocratic
political culture in Bangladesh. Any attempts at democratic consolida-
tion and deepening have had to contend with these adverse historical
legacies. This comparison is interesting and useful for a number of com-
pelling reasons. It gives a glimpse of the underlying structural factors
that contributed 10 the markedly divergenl political trajectories of India
and Bangladesh even though they emerged from the common detritus of
the same imperial entity.
India: The Rule of Law
The success of democracy in India must be traced instead to indi-
viduals within the Indian nationalist movement who seized upon certain
British liberal ideas and principles and Ihen sought 10 transplant them
in Indian soil over a span of several decades." It is also closely related to
Ihe emergence of a "catch-all party," the Indian National Congress, that,
at least in principle. sought 10 represent all Indians regardless of their
regional, caste, class, or ethnic affiliations. The participation of this
unrelenlingly anticolonial party in slowly expanding forms of self-gov-
ernment prepared it to seize the reins of democratic governance in the
post independence era.
India. which made its transition to democracy with a remarkable
absence of violence (once the extraordinarily bloody process of parti-
tion by Ihe British was over). saw a high degree of adherence 10 the rule
of law in the early years of its independence." The country's first prime
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, a key member of the nationalist movement.
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was committed to the highest standards of probity in public life. Many
of the members of his cabinet were equally committed to similar norms
of conduct.' The exigencies of politics did. of course, lead Nehru to
make minor concessions. On occasion, for example, he chose not to
investigate allegations of illegal activities on the pan of some of his
ministers." Nevertheless, for the most part during the initial years after
independence, especially in comparison with most other postcolonial
states, the adherence to the rule of law in India was exemplary.
Yet this outstanding stan has not carried through to the present. The
decline in the rule of law. ironically, started under Nehru's daughter and
India's third prime minister, Indira Gandhi. In the I 970s, in an attempt to
bolster the sagging popularity of the Congress Party, she promoted a
series of populist slogans and measures. One of her key electoral prom-
ises was garibi hatao or (literally "drive out poverty"). This slogan, not
surprisingly, won many adherents, and shortly after her sweeping elec-
toral victory in 1970 she embarked on a series of populist measures
including the nationalization of banks and key industries such as iron
and steel. She also did away with the "privy purses," the annual govern-
ment subsidies to the fanner princely rulers of India. Few of these measures
made any dent in India's endemic poverty, however. Economic growth
rates continued to hover around 3 to 4 percent annually, and India's rural
and urban poor saw few improvements in the quality of their daily exist-
ence.? What her slogans and policies did do, was create a climate of
increased expectations among India's impoverished electorate.
When confronted with these dramatic and expanding expectations,
Indira Gandhi quickly realized that the country lacked the institutional
and material capacities to address them adequately. Soon she saw these
newly enfranchised voters tum to regional political parties in pursuit of
their goals. In a crude attempt to bolster the declining electoral pros-
pects of the Congress Party, she resorted to two techniques that
dramatically undermined the rule of law. The first was her rampant abuse
of Anicle 356 of the Indian constitution, a clause that allows the na-
tional government to dismiss a state government if it has lost the
confidence of the local electorate or if it cannot maintain a modicum of
civil order. On the most dubious pretexts she dismissed state govern-
ments. thereby making a mockery of India's constitutional provisions. to
The second set of moves was even more egregious. She and her elder
son, Sanjay Gandhi, brought large numbers of callow youth into the
Congress Party to be used as enforcers. These prospectless young men
had little regard for democratic procedures or legal norms. Their princi-
pal purpose was to serve as a private army in closely contested elections
to intimidate voters, cow political opponents, and, on occasion, to at-
tempt the subversion of other electoral processes. The political
protection and patronage that these men enjoyed frequently demoral-
ized local police and other administrative authorities, creating a climate
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in which the rule of law could be flouted with impunity. Worse still.
civil servants who refused to knuckle under to the demands of politi-
cians were frequently transferred to less desirable postings: in a short
time the political independence of the bureaucracy was thoroughly com-
promised. Inevitably. the norms of professional conduct within the
previously highly regarded Indian Administrative Service (lAS) started
to decline, as political interference became rampant. As these norms
frayed, politicians increasingly came to rely on local kingpins to threaten
and harass political opponents with little fear of police and other au-
thorities.
In the 1990s, the blatant involvement of politicians with known crimi-
nals became so widespread that the government felt compelled to create
a one-man commission to investigate and report on the politician-crimi-
nal nexus. The commission. created in 1995. was headed by N.N. Vohra,
a former senior lAS officer known for his impeccable professional record.
Vohra's report, which was submitted within a year, provided a damning
indictment of the politician-criminal nexus. Though excerpts from the
report were leaked to prominent Indian newsmagazines, the full con-
tents of the report were never made public. The underlying problem that
Vohra identified in his report continues to plague Indian politics. Ac-
cording to one reliable source, as many as seven hundred state legislators
and forty members of parliament have criminal backgrounds. \I In some
states, the ties between politicians and criminals are quite tight. J2 Since
Vohra submitted his famous report. there have been few improvements
in this arena. In the parliament that was convened in June 2004, at least
a hundred of the 542 members had criminal cases pending against them.')
Though the Election Commission has long recommended that individu-
als under indictment should not be aJlowed to contest elections, no
political party has found it desirable or expedient to implement this
injunction. Given the composition of the many state legislatures, not to
mention the national parliament, it is highly unlikely that this critical
issue will receive legislative attention anytime soon.
Another key problem with the rule of law in India is the enormous
case load confronting Indian courts at local, state and national levels.
According to one estimate it takes an average of twenty years to resolve
a civil lawsuit in India." Despite periodic calls for judicial reform, little
effort has been expended to address this severe backlog. Ironically. the
advent of a new form of judicial activism, public-interest litigation.
which is designed to provide access to the indigent and the dispos-
sessed, may increase this extraordinary burden on the courts."
Accountability
The quality of governmental accountability in India varies widely.
At the most basic level of accountability-reasonably free and fair elec-
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tions at local, state and national levels-India no longer fares badly.
The existence of the politician-criminal nexus notwithstanding, three
factors have played a vital role in preventing the corruption of the
electoral process. First, the extraordinary level of political mobiliza-
tion that has taken place over the last two decades has made hitherto
disenfranchised voters far more conscious of their political rights and
privileges. All Indian national electoral surveys reveal that citizens
from the "lower" castes are becoming increasingly assertive in state and
national politics and are playing a vital role in ensuring electoral alter-
nations. Second, since the 1976-77 "emergency," when civil liberties
and press freedoms were dramatically curtailed, the Indian press has
assumed an important watchdog role. Politicians still resort to the use
of local condottieri to try and alter electoral outcomes. Press vigilance,
however, frequently exposes these dubious schemes. When such mal-
feasances are brought under public scrutiny, the revitalized Election
Commission routinely countermands the election outcome and arranges
a revote. Third, and in a related vein, some institutions have shown
renewed signs of vigor. In this context, the Indian Election Commis-
sion, long a somnolent body, has in recent years evinced an increasing
willingness and ability to ensure the fairness of electoral outcomes."
The success of the Election Commission has even attracted the atten-
tion of mOremature democracies. Ironically enough, the British Election
Commission, established in 2000, has sought to study the successful
practices of its Indian counterpart. 17
At another level, however, governmental accountability leaves much
to be desired. A tradition has long existed in India. hailing back to
British colonial practices, to appoint commissions of inquiry. More
often than not, retired judges, drawn from the higher realms of the judi-
ciary, are called upon to head these commissions. Commissions may
examine such matters as the excessive use of force by local police, the
failure of a state government to prevent a riot, or, most recently, a sig-
nificant intelligence failure. IS The commissions usually have the power
to subpoena key individuals, to hold public hearings and to make rec-
ommendations based upon their findings. The commissions frequently
produce thoughtful, candid. and honest accounts of the issue that they
were asked to address. Unfortunately, since the findings of the commis-
sions have no binding legal features, governments are free to disregard
their recommendations. For example the Shah Commission headed by
retired Justice Shah was asked to investigate the causes of the pogrom
against the Sikh community in New Delhi in the aftermath of the assas-
sination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. The commission, to
its credit, correctly and courageously identified certain members of the
ruling Congress Party and significant segments of the New Delhi police
force as the principal perpetrators of heinous crimes against the hapless
Sikh population. Yet in the intervening two decades, apart from a few
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low-level police personnel, none of the principals involved in organiz-
ing, directing, and implementing the pogrom have been produced in
court, let alone faced criminal prosecution. 19 What explains this abject
failure to act on the recommendations of a commission of inquiry? The
answers are complex. In the case of the New Delhi pogrom, the ruling
Congress Party was simply loath to move against many of its powerful
notables. Subsequent governments have been either too short-lived or
too willing to engage in political logrolling to bring criminal charges
against the perpetrators. Compounding this problem, of course, is the
enormous backlog of cases facing courts at local, state, and national
levels. Finally, with the passage of time, evidence once collected is lost,
memories of the victims tend to fade, and other, more immediate issues
crowd the political agenda of national parties and governments.
Is accountability, then, simply absent from Indian political life? Such
an assertion is unsustainable. One of the more novel methods of ensur-
ing accountability is the previously mentioned development of public-
interest litigation. This revolution can be traced to the pioneering work
of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, a former chief justice of the Indian Supreme
Court. Bhagwati cogently argued that in a vast country with widespread
poverty one way of rendering the courts accessible to ordinary citizens
seeking legal redress was through the development of public-interest
litigation. Accordingly, any citizen of India who believes that a par-
ticular set of laws is not being implemented, or that the government
stands in violation of an existing set of laws, need only send a postcard
to the Supreme Court seeking action. If the case is deemed to be justi-
ciable, the Court will respond accordingly. In the wake of Bhagwati's
decision, the Court bas been bombarded with such requests. Some, of
course, have been frivolous and the Court has accordingly tossed them
out. But in a range of cases brought to its attention the Court has acted,
to much salutary effect." It has shut down polluting industries, ordered
major metropolitan governments to conform to auto-emission rules, and
provided redress to unconvicted prisoners incarcerated for extended
periods of time.
One possible misgiving about this form of judicial activism may be
the overextension of the judiciary's powers. This is a legitimate concern
in a democratic state where balance has to be maintained between the
various branches of government. In the Indian case, however, the judi-
ciary has evinced a willingness not to encroach on the authority of the
other branches of government."
One key mechanism for vertical accountability in India remains the
free press. In the years following independence, it was both professional
and diligent. Sadly, it did not display these qualities during the state of
emergency that Indira Gandhi declared largely to ensure her political
survival, when most of the rights that are guaranteed under the Indian
constitution were in abeyance." The Indian press, for the most part.
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acted in a fairly supine fashion under the state of emergency. With
minor exceptions, most newspaper editors all too readily submitted to
censorship. In the aftermath of the emergency, however, the press, per-
haps because of the chagrin about its role during that period, took on a
markedly different orientation. Indeed it can be argued that the press
assumed a remarkably feisty character and focused on investigative
joumalism with considerable vigor and efficacy. Since that time, the
Indian press has performed a yeoman watchdog role, exposing govern-
mental corruption, taking recalcitrant civil servants to task, revealing
governmental indifference to violence against minorities and lower-
caste groups, and reporting on failures of governance in all parts of the
country.Among other matters, in recent years the press has been respon-
sible for bringing to light the Rajiv Gandhi government's payment of
kickbacks for the purchase of the Swedish Bofors field gun; for reveal-
ing the financial malfeasances of a minister of communications, Sukh
Ram, in the allotment of wireless-telephone licenses; for uncovering
PrimeMinister Narasimha Rao' s offer of financial inducements to mem-
bers of an opposition party to support the ruling regime on a crucial
vote in parliament; and for drawing attention to the financial irregulari-
ties of the then-chief minister of Bihar, Laloo Prasad Yadav, in the
purchase of animal fodder using state funds. The results of the revela-
tions have been mixed. At the time of this writing, despite extensive
investigations carried out by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI),
India's apex investigative body, no convictions have been obtained in
the Bofors case. Rao, indicted but never brought to trial, left office in
disgrace. Ram and Yadav, however, were both charged and indicted,
losing their respective offices." Subsequently, however, despite vari-
ous cases pending against him. Yadav was elected to national office in
June 2004 even though a number of his associates, including members
of the Indian Administrative Service, have received prison terms for
their involvement in the animal fodder scam.
Responsiveness
The responsiveness of Indian democracy to the expectations of its
citizens also varies enormously depending on the area under discussion.
Despite a fairly consistent history of procedural democracy since inde-
pendence (barring Indira Gandhi's 1976-77 state of emergency), poverty
and hunger remain endemic in India. Yet it would be inaccurate to sug-
gest that the Indian state is utterly unresponsive to the needs of its citizens.
One of the most dramatic and least heralded successes of Indian democ-
racy has been the avoidance of mass death from famine or famine-like
conditions. It appears that one of the critical institutions whose presence
helps to guard against the tragedy of mass starvation is the Indian media.
Amartya Sen, the Indian Nobel laureate in economics, has deftly argued
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that India's free press has prevented mass death in times of drought and
famine. The logic of his argument is deceptively simple. A free press
ensures the prompt flow of information about the prospects of mass deaths
from hunger. Politicians fearful of an electoral backlash in the face of
mass starvation ensure that the machinery of the state acts with alacrity to
prevent such an occurrence." Sen contrasts postindependence India' s
avoidance of mass death during famines with that of China under the
totalitarian regime of Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution as
well as India under authoritarian British rule as late as the 1940s." Al-
though Indian democracy has not made sufficient progress toward the
eradication of mass poverty and hunger in fifty-odd years of indepen-
dence, it has managed to ensure that mass death from hunger no longer
stalks the land when the country is confronted with a crop failure.
In the realm of primary education. however, Indian democracy has
proven to be singularly unresponsive to existing needs. Even though
India can justifiably boast an extraordinary degree of success in pro-
moting higher education, its record in providing universal primary
schooling is abysmal. Myron Weiner's harsh 1991 indictment of India's
failure to address this issue is worth quoting:
Primary education in India is not compulsory, nor is child labor illegal. The
result is that less than half of India's children between ages six and four-
teen-82.2 million-are not in school. They stay at home to care for the
cattle. tend to younger children. collect firewood. and work in the fields.
They find employment in cottage industries, tea stalls, restaurants, or as
household workers in middle-class homes. They become prostitutes or live
as street children, begging or picking rags and bottles from trash for resale.
Many are bonded laborers, tending cattle and working as agricultural la-
borers for local landowners."
Conditions have not significantly improved in India since the publi-
cation of Weiner's important study. In 2003, India spent a mere 1.7
percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GOP) on primary education and
a total of 3.4 percent of its GOP for education overall." The results of
such low spending are apparent. According to World Bank statistics, in
2003-2004,39 percent of the population over the age of 15 was illiter-
ate." The reasons for this neglect of primary education are complex.
Part of the explanation is sociological. It can be traced to the elitist
class background of India's first generation of political leaders, who
emphasized higher education over universal primary education. An-
other component of the explanation involves path dependence." Critical
elite choices made through India's extensive and labyrinthine economic-
planning process locked in certain developmental priorities that are not
easy to modify. In the wake of the June 2004 electoral defeat of the
coalition government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the new
ruling coalition led by the Congress party has chosen to allocate sig-
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nificantly greater resources to primary education. How well this new
developmental priority will be implemented remains an open question."
Freedom and Rights
The Indian constitution provides a range of guarantees in terms of
personal rights and civil liberties. The vast majority of these rights are
procedural, and include the freedoms of expression and assembly, the
prohibition against arbitrary detention and trial, and the right to profess
the religion of one's choice. A preamble to the constitution, the "Direc-
tive Principles of State Policy," also exhorts the state to provide citizens
with a range of substantive. albeit nonjusticiable, socioeconomic rights."
It should be underscored that these rights are entirely hortatory: The
state is not legally obligated to guarantee these rights to its citizens.
The actual implementation of many of these most laudable rights can
be a highly uncertain affair. To begin with, one's social class profoundly
influences one's ability to secure many of these procedural rights. The
indigent, minorities, and members of lower castes often receive arbitrary
treatment at the hands of those who wield coercive power. Police fre-
quently resort to extort, harass, and intimidate individuals whose social
class affords them little or no protection from such illegal behavior. It
needs to be underscored, however, that the degree of police misbehavior
varies considerably from state to state within India. Certain states are
more likely to curb police malfeasance than others. For example, in poorly
governed northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya
Pradesh, atrocities committed against lower castes are routine. Worse
still. local police and judicial authorities rarely aggressively pursue the
perpetrators of these acts. On the other hand, systematic caste violence is
mostly absent in southern India and much of eastern India. Furthermore,
state governments in these areas are far more likely to take cognizance of
such outbreaks of caste violence and seek to put a quick end to them."
The explanation for these geographic variations lies in a complex
congeries of factors. In the 1950s and 1960s, Southern India underwent a
virtual nonviolent revolution that transformed the social importance of
caste." A similar process is now under way in northern India. However, as
lower castes and minorities (who are more numerous in northern India)
seek to assert their rights. the wielders of political power, who are dispro-
portionately high-caste Hindus, are resorting to both legal and illegal
means to preserve the old social order. This contest has contributed to
much violence and political turmoil throughout northern India over the
past decade. The realization of the rights of the poor, the dispossessed,
and minorities, however, is simply a matter of time as long as India can
maintain some facets of its democratic institutions and practices.
The initial verdict of some of the ablest social scientists working on
the subject of lower-caste empowerment reinforces this optimistic coo-
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elusion. As the Congress party, the dominant postindependence politi-
cal organization, failed to address the felt grievances of citizens from
the historically lower castes, other forces stepped into the breach.
Congress's empty populism may never have delivered on its promises,
but it did raise lower-caste expectations. Not surprisingly, other re-
gional political parties, often caste-based, successfully capitalized on
Congress's shortcomings. As lower-caste voters and groups have come
more thoroughly to grasp the logic and power of electoral politics. they
have over the last two decades shifted their allegiances away from Con-
gress and toward a number of caste-based political parties. This growing
political sophistication of voters in northern India is now fueling what
one social scientist has dubbed "India's silent revolution.">
This discussion of freedom and rights would be incomplete without
some attention to whether and how rights have been upheld in places
and at times when normal politics are in abeyance. The suspension of
normal politics in India has taken place on a nationwide basis only
once during a half-century and more of independence. This occurred
during the "state of emergency" that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi de-
clared in 1976. It is well known that most constitutional safeguards
protecting the freedom of expression as well as personal rights and civil
liberties were flagrantly violated during this time. The experience of
the emergency, however, is widely regarded as little more than an
anomaly, albeit an important one, in India's democratic career.
The abuse of constitutionally guaranteed rights, however, has been
widespread in India when the Indian state has sought to quell insurgent
sc-movements." Such abuses have occurred in the state's response to .
, , in th h ' collycessiomst movements 10 t e nort east, in the Punjab, and most rec
in Kashmir. The abuses have included, but have not been limited to. th.e
use of torture to extract information from suspected terrorists, extrajud.J~
cial killings, and arbitrary detention without trial. 36 In the Puoj"b. '~.
particular, the police and paramilitary forces developed the practice 0
.. killinzs." ' hi h d wereencounter I mgs, 10 W IC suspected terrorists, once capture. t
frequently summarily executed without trial. When questioned abou
these deaths, the police would routinely and vaguely reply lbal the
suspects had been ki~led in ~n ~·e.ncounter."37 -red
The success of this extrajUdiCIal method of dealing with sus peL:
terrorists and criminal gangs within the context of an insurgency htld a
inz d ion effecr t lhalsweeping emonstratlon elect 10 India. There is some evidence . I
police in particular metropolitan areas-tired of dealing with judiCI~
sloth, the resort to dilatory tactics on the part of deft defense lawyers.
and the prospect of intimidation of key witnesses to violent crif1les~
h~ve now adopted "encounter killings" when dealing with the J1l0~_
violent elements of the organized criminal underworld." Undefstal1
able but particularly distressing is the substantial public support ::~
these methods in the absence of other legal means to bring hard<
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criminals to the dock. The routinization of these methods of police
workthreatens to undermine the bedrock of a fundamental right in a
democracy, namely adherence to the due process of Jaw even when
dealingwith the most egregious of suspected criminals.
The rights of religious minorities, most notably Muslims, have been
undersystematic attack since the late 1980s. On a number of occasions,
various state governments in India have at best been complicit, and at
worst actively implicated in attacks on India's Muslim minority. The
worstof these events occurred in February 2003 in the town of Godhra,
in the northwestern state of Gujarat. After some Muslim miscreants al-
legedly set fire to a train carrying Hindu pilgrims, killing some fifty
individuals, Hindu mobs, either in concert with or with the passive
connivanceof local police and politicians, attacked Muslims in Godhra
and other parts of the state. Before public order was finally restored a
weeklater, several thousand Muslims had lost their lives at the hands of
these rampaging mobs." Police cases have been lodged against a num-
ber of individuals believed to have been involved in orchestrating the
pogrom.Yet it is far from clear that Gujarat's state government, which
did little in the first place to stop the anti-Muslim mayhem, will pros-
ecute the perpetrators with any vigor. More recently, forensic evidence
has come to light which suggests that the attack against the Hindu
pilgrims by putative Muslim miscreants may not have taken place at
all." The only hope for some redress lies in the continued willingness
and ability of India's Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of a petition
that the National Human Rights Commission submitted to move the
cases from Gujarat to the neighboring state of Maharashtra to ensure a
fair trail:" The statement of Chief Justice Khare of the Indian Supreme
Court that there was "complete collusion" between the prosecutors and
the accused in the rioting cases in Gujarat underscores the utterly com-
promised features of the judicial process in Gujarat under a viciously
partisan and anti-Muslim state governrnent.?
The challenge that violently anti secular sentiments and actions pose
to the quality of Indian democratic life cannot be overstated. Should
Indian democracy be stripped of its secular orientation, the quality of
that democracy wiJI be severely compromised. Indeed, India may head
toward becoming what Fareed Zakaria has aptly termed an "illiberal
democracy," wherein the rights of religious and ethnic minorities are at
risk even though electoral alternations take place routinely and in a
moderately free and fair fashion.
Equality
According to the World Bank's estimate for 2003 and 2004 •.29 per-
cent of India's population of more than one billion people remain at an
income level below the national poverty line. Nearly half (47 percent)
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of all children under five are Ihought to be malnourished. Other statis-
tics also suggest significant and persistent gaps in wealth and income.
Indeed according to some measures, the pattern of inequality that per-
vaded Indian society at independence persists. One important indicator
thereof, the Gini coefficient of per-capita expenditure, has remained
largely constant over this extended time span. However, as thoughtful
analysts have argued, this measure may not adequately capture pro-
found social changes that have taken place since independence." Up-
per-caste dominance is steadily on the decline, progress has been made
toward universal elementary education, absentee landlordism has been
legally abolished, and the right of universal adult franchise constitu-
tionally enshrined. Consequently, even fitful attempts to promote equal-
ity through public policies have had significant ameliorative effects
that cannot be adequately measured through conventional statistical
techniques. Even one of the most eminent and staunchest critics of
social stratification in India concedes that Indian democracy is "a secu-
lar miracle in the modem world" while acknowledging that "the quality
of our democracy is poor. "44
Since 1991 India has embarked upon a fitful but significant effort at
economic liberalization." There is little question that economic growth
has improved dramatically as a result. The Indian economy, having
shed a labyrinthine set of economic controls, production quotas, and
internal and external tariffs, has managed to transcend what the econo-
mist Raj Krishna once posited as "the Hindu rate of growth"-meaning
3 percent or less per annum during the long years of pseodosocialist
economic planning. Over the last decade. India's annual rate of eco-
nomic growth has hovered between 5 and 7 percent, and this despite
exogenous shocks. Some Indian economists believe that with even more
of the right policies in place, India can achieve double-digit annual
economic growth. A vigorous debate has now emerged about the contri-
bution of rapid economic growth to poverty alleviation. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to discuss in any detail this debate, but
unsurprisingly, the devotees of liberalization contend that rapid growth
has contributed to poverty alleviation. Those opposed to the disman-
tling of the structure of economic planning argue otherwise."
Bangladesh
Bangladesh fares poorly on most indicators of the "quality of de-
mocracy." Much of its difficulty in consolidating and enhancing de-
mocracy can be traced to its semicolonial past. Until 1971,
overwhelmingly Muslim Bangladesh was the eastern province of the
Pakistani state that had come into being as a result of the 1947 partition
of British India. During this time, West Pakistan treated East Pakistan-
from which it was widely separated by the vast expanse of northern
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India-as a virtual internal colony." West Pakistan absorbed most of
the foreign aid and investment while also dominating the ranks of the
powerful Pakistani civil service and armed forces. Most galling to East
Pakistanis, however, was the denial of national status for their own
language (Bengali) and the imposition instead of Urdu, the dominant
language of West Pakistan. Ultimately, the accumulated grievances
drove the growth of Bengali subnationalism, which in turn led to civil
war. Indian intervention in this civil war ultimately contributed to the
creation of Bangladesh.
Sadly, the nascent state started its political existence with a number
of important institutional handicaps. The first postindependence leader
of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, was a remarkably charismatic
populist. Notionally, he was committed to the creation of a democratic,
egalitarian, and secular polity. In practice, however, Sheikh Mujib, as
he was popularly known, did little or nothing to foster an institutional
legacy to promote those ends. The Awami League, the party to which he
belonged, was mostly woven around his political personality. Addi-
tionally, soon after assuming power following Bangladesh's indepen-
dence from Pakistan, Mujib proved singularly inept at addressing the
vast tasks of social and economic reconstruction. Moreover, his admin-
istration was riddled with corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency. As
political instability mounted and the government's ability to maintain
public order declined, Mujib increasingly resorted to authoritarian mea-
sures. He declared a state of emergency in 1975 and dispensed with the
parliamentary form of government, declaring himself to be the presi-
dent of Bangladesh."
In fairness to Mujib, it should be noted that the tasks which he con-
fronted were daunting. To begin with he had to contend with creating a
state out of a breakaway province. Additionally, he had to deal with a
segment of the Bangladeshi military that remained unreconciled to the
breakup of Pakistan and still harbored pro-Pakistani sentiments. He faced
the intransigence of the radical Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami, a political party
fundamentally opposed to the creation of a separate, independent state
of Bangladesh. Finally, his administration had to contend with the
simple but compelling matter of curbing the powers of local condottieri
who had emerged in the wake of the civil war. All these factors under-
mined the stability of his regime, and he was assassinated along with
most members of his immediate family in a sanguinary military coup
later in 1975.
The military regime led by General Zia-ur-Rehman justified its take-
over on the usual grounds: the previous government had failed to curb
growing lawlessness, had been involved in corruption, and had failed
to address a number of pressing social and economic needs. Zia's re-
gime promised to address these myriad ills. To some small degree he did
deliver on his promises: as economic development did take place, some
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of the cronyism of the Mujib years was curbed, and efforts to limit
problematically rapid population growth were put into place. Yet civil
liberties and personal rights were squelched and the Zia regime dis-
played scant regard for the rights of the substantial Hindu minority. The
formal commitment to a secular state that promised equality before the
law for all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation, evaporated under
Zia's military dictatorship.
Zia's regime, in tum, was overthrown in yet anothermilitary coup in
May 1981. The democratic interregnum that ensued proved to he short-
lived. In March 1982, Lieutenant General Husain Mohammed Ershad
overthrew the faltering and inefficacious regime of President Abdus Sattar.
Ershad's regime, in turn, lasted until 1991. Since then Bangladesh has
made a rocky transition to democracy. Yet the fundamental norms that
should undergird a democratic polity have yet to take hold. Even though
routine alternations of government take place through the electoral pro-
cess, none of the major political parties has accepted the principle of an
honest and loyal opposition. The aftermath of every national election fol-
lows a predictable, desultory pattern: The victorious party exults while the
defeated party promptly contends that the electoral process was flawed and
refuses to abide by the results of the election." Both the Awami League and
the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) have shown scant regard for the other
when in opposition. They have routinely resorted to extraparliamentary
tactics including demonstrations, strikes, and chicanery in order to under-
mine each other's ability to govern." Unsurprisingly, Bangladesh fares
poorly in assessments of democratic quality.
The Rule of Law
In Bangladesh, the rule of law is decidedly brittle. The state has a
nominally independent judiciary that follows the canons of British
common law. In practice, however, the judiciary is quite pliant and
subject to political intervention and direction. The police are under-
paid, poorly trained, ineffective, and venal. The inadequate training
and skills of the police lead them to use uncalibrated force, frequently
resulting in the deaths of innocent bystanders. Most importantly, they
are acutely subject to blatant political interference. Particular govern-
ments regularly use the police to harass political opponents rather
than as neutral instruments for the maintenance of public order. Fur-
thermore, oversight of police conduct is exceedingly weak. Individuals
are frequently arrested without adequate cause under the terms of the
sweeping Special Powers Act, and deaths in police custody are dis-
turbingly common."
A recent example illustrates the problem of rampant, state-sanctioned
police misconduct. In late 2002, in an ostensible effort to enhance the
quality of law and order across the country, the BNP regime of Prime
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Minister Begum Khaleda Zia launched "Operation Clean Heart." This
operation involved some 40,000 military personnel and was putatively
designed to arrest "listed criminals," to recover illegal firearms, and to
improve the deteriorating law-and-order situation across the country.
Contrary to these stated aims, however, much of this police and military
operation was turned into a vendetta against political opponents.
Such state-sanctioned police misconduct further undermines the pro-
fessional mores of an already overburdened, underequipped, and poorly
trained police force. Consequently, the police forces are not nearly as
good as they need to be at upholding the law and solving common
crimes, but are dismayingly energetic at corrupt activities such as ex-
tortion and bribe-taking. To compound all these problems, rampant
political interference in the day-to-day functioning of the police fur-
ther erodes their professionalism, effectiveness, and credibility.
Accountability
At one level, the forms of behavior recounted above can be traced to
the bureaucratic-authoritarian political culture that pervaded East Pa-
kistan. Bureaucrats wield significant amounts of political and coercive
power and can exercise it with considerable impunity. Furthermore, the
country's shaky transition to democracy has done little to instill a cul-
ture of accountability into its bureaucracy. Since the nation's parliament
functions fitfully and in a blatantly partisan fashion, little effort is ex-
pended in ensuring systematic oversight of the bureaucracy. The norms
of parliamentary democracy, so well embedded in India, are acutely
lacking in Bangladesh. Consequently, while political meddling with
the bureaucracy is common, responsible oversight by elected officials
is rare. The meddling is often manifest in the manipulation of official
appointments, promotions, and transfers, and also in the blatantly parti-
san ways in which state funds are diverted to or from various public
projects. 52
One instrument of accountability in a democracy is a free press.
Bangladesh does have feisty media outlets with little fear of criticizing
the government of the day. And yet journalists who especially annoy
the powerful can become victims of harassment tactics ranging from
physical assault to outright death threats. Matters have worsened sig-
nificantly under the coalition government of Begum Khaleda Zia." The
Zia government has been especially sensitive about its record on mi-
nority rights, the behavior of some of its radical Islamist coalition
partners, and the possible ties of some Bangladeshi political organiza-
tions to Islamic radicals in Indonesia and Pakistan. 54
A relative bright spot in the area of accountability has been the con-
duct of national elections. While losers still regularly hurl charges of
skullduggery, deceit, and perfidy, pressure from the international donor
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community has led the Bangladeshi state to make significant progress
toward conducting moderately free and fair national elections.
An independent Election Commission monitors the conduct of elec-
tions, which are held under the aegis of a "caretaker government." This
innovation. which came about with the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Bangladeshi constitution, proved necessary because of the lack of faith
that the opposition typically felt toward the party or parties in power at
any given moment. Under the terms of this system. the most recently
retired chief justice of Bangladesh heads up the caretaker regime and is
responsible for the neutral conduct of elections in conjunction with the
Election Commission. Despite the existence of this institutional ar-
rangement. political parties of all coloration have questioned the
neutrality of the caretaker government when they have fared poorly at
the polls."
Systematic and statistical evidence on vertical accountability is
unavailahle in Bangladesh. Though the Bangladeshi press is mostly
free. it cannot provide effective vertical accountability. The reasons
are complex. To begin with. the level of professionalism in Bang-
ladeshi journalism has always heen extremely low. Again. the legacy
of authoritarianism is a major cause. During the long years of Paki-
stani rule, the press both in both East and the West faced severe re-
slriclions. After the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent
NIBle.B free press did emerge. However. as Jack Snyder has cogently
argued. a free press does not amount to one that is necessarily profes-
sional and norm-bound;" The press in Bangladesh-lacking adequate
training. bereft of independent professional organizations that en-
gage in self-policing. and subject to the demands of powerful own-
en-cannot be deemed autonomous. Instead, it is so bias-ridden, and
so frequently publishes articles based upon rumor and innuendo, that
it cannot serve a useful and reliable watchdog role. In recent years.
particularly under BNP-Ied regimes. it has even faced a degree of
government harassment especially when iI has sought to highlight
the plight of hapless minorities.
Responsiveness
State responsiveness to felt needs and grievances is extremely weak
in Bangladesh, Ironically. the state is more responsive to the demands
and expectations of the international donor communities than to the
hopes of much of its own populace. The responsiveness to the donor
c?mmunity stems from Bangladesh's acute dependence upon foreign
aid. As one of the poorest nations in the world. it can ill afford to incur
the wrath ,of its global donors.v Consequently. certain governmental
program. In Bangladesh have been remarkably successful. These in-
clude efforts to reduce the endemic incidence of cholera and to curb...
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runaway population growth. Both of these matters were important pri-
orities of major international donors and, not surprisingly, have received
sustained attention from various Bangladeshi governments.
One area where the state has shown some promise in the arena of
responsiveness without the benefit of external pressure is that of judi-
cial reform. As in India, the Bangladeshi judiciary is hopelessly
swamped by an overdue caseload. In an effort to address this million-
case backlog, the Bangladeshi Ministry of Law set up a pilot program
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in 2001 in the city of Comilla. This
pilot program allows people to bring their grievances first to citizen
mediators who have some familiarity with the law before going to
court. Initial citizen response has been mostly positive. It remains to
be seen if the government will now extend the reach of this program
nationwide. sa
Freedom and Rights
The constitution of Bangladesh formally guarantees a range of civil
and political rights. Their realization, however, is another matter en-
tirely. Weak judicial institutions. partial and unprofessional police, and
an unresponsive bureaucracy blight the prospects that most Bangladeshis
will in practice be able to call on these rights when tbey need tbem.
For example, in the area of civil rights, the constitution formally
bans the use of torture as well as cruel, inhumane, and degrading forms
of punishment. Yet police routinely use torture as an instrument of policy
and those responsible for these acts are rarely. if ever. punished.
Bangladesh's record in protecting the rights of its religious and ethnic
minorities is even worse. Created as a secular state, Bangladesh aban-
doned this constitutional commitment within the first decade of its
existence and made Islam its state religion. Its substantial Hindu minor-
ity, which includes somewhere between 11 and 16 percent of the
populace, has faced routine harassment and even physical intimidation
in recent years. S9 Other ethnic minorities, most notably the Buddhist
Chakmas, have seen the steady erosion of their rights since Bangladesh
came into being in 1971.6<1The state has sought to deny them their
linguistic rights, has alienated their land, and has sought to forcibly
assimilate them into the majority culture.
The rights of religious minorities deserve some discussion. Their
rights, though long formally guaranteed under the constitution, have
been under assault since the inception of the Bangladeshi state and
have eroded dramatically since the late 1990s. Members of non-Muslim
communities face routine employment discrimination, especially when
seeking government jobs. Their property rights have also been severely
undermined, with state consent. by the now-repealed Vested Property
Act. Though this law was overturned in 2001, the state has made only
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feeble efforts to return property seized from the Hindu minority under
the act's aegis."
The rights of women have also come under increasing assault de-
spite the presence of women at the head of each of the two main political
parties. Outside the highly educated uppermost precincts of
Bangladeshi society. women face severe discrimination. Their plight
has worsened in recent years with the rise of Islamic zealotry, 62 espe-
cially since 2001 when the radical the Jamaat-i-Islami joined the ruling
coalition. As the principal member of the coalition, the BNP remains
dependent upon the Jamaat-i-Islarni for parliamentary support and thus
the BNP's leader, Begum Zia, has been loath to contain the activities
of the Islamic zealots."
Equality
Any notion of human equality confronts almost insuperable barriers
in Bangladesh, a desperately poor country with an annual per capita
income of about US$375.'" According to the World Bank, in 2003-
2004, 50 percent of the population remained below the national pov-
erty line and 48 percent of children under five were malnourished."
The bulk of the country's wealth and productive resources remains con-
centrated in the hands of a tiny and rapacious elite. This elite resides
mostly in Dhaka, the capital, and is noted for taking much interest in
conspicuous consumption and little in Bangladesh's overall develop-
ment. In the foreseeable future there is little prospect for the growth of
a substantial middle class.
Though Bangladesh boasts a large number of nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) dedicated to the alleviation of both rural and urban
poverty, their actual impact appears slight. One of the better-known
indigenous NGOs, which pioneered the provision of microcredit, is the
Grameen Bank. Founded in 1976 and formally converted into a bank in
1983, Grameen lends primarily to poor women and claims a 98 percent
repayment rate. (A figure that some critics question.) Since its incep-
tion, the bank has disbursed as much as $4.2 billion through some
1,200 branches. It is now seeking to help beggars start businesses under
a new and innovative program." These efforts, though well meaning,
appear extremely limited when compared to the vast, endemic, and per-
vasive problems of poverty and inequality that confront Bangladesh
today.
As in India, the social rights that the Bangladeshi constitution lists
are merely hortatory. The Bangladeshi state has no formal or legal
commitment to the preservation or enhancement of the social rights of
its citizens. Consequently, any attempt to provide social rights to the
vast majority of Bangladeshi citizens stems from the activities of a
range of nongovernmental organizations. When it comes to providing
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effectual social rights to citizens, the Bangladeshi state is more hin-
drance than help.
Conclusions
What explains the uneven quality of democracy in India and the very
poor quality of democracy in Bangladesh? In both cases, their histori-
cal legacies explain a great deal. In the Indian case, the long period of
British colonial rule reinforced existing social and economic hierar-
chies and crystallized certain social mores that are inimical to democracy.
For example, the social artifacts of caste and religious community were
significantly bolstered and strengthened under British rule. The colo-
nial census played a significant role in sharply delineating both religious
boundaries and caste distinctions. Consequently, social identities that
had ooce been fluid now became firm and fixed. The defining of these
identities provided the basis of much social conflict as political entre-
preneurs sought to exploit religious differences and accentuate existing
caste conflicts. Such ethnoreligious cleavages could hardly be condu-
cive to the development of democratic politics.
At another level. the reinforcement of existing social and economic
hierarchies proved a barrier to democratic politics. India had many lead-
ers who were notionally committed to egalitarian principles, but who at
the same time had imbibed influential British cultural ideas about the
putative need for class stratification and social hierarchy. Happily, how-
ever, the persistent efforts of social activists and the continued working
of democratic institutions (especially free and fair elections) kept salu-
tary challenges to the existing social order alive and effectively propelled
the cause of fuller democratization.
All these problems. of course, manifested themselves even more in-
tensely in Bangladesh, which during its first 24 years as East Pakistan
had access to none of the benefits of open, democratic politics. As a
virtual internal colony of its western wing it had a double burden to
bear. Its elites had inherited many of the same social prejudices as their
Indian counterparts, and still worse, were not forced to make any mean-
ingful accommodations even after the creation of Pakistan. Instead, as
Pakistan quickly fell victim to authoritarian rule, many of these norms
of hierarchy and deference, far from coming under challenge, met in-
stead with nothing but reinforcement. Moreover, since the state of Paki-
stan had done little to foster democratic institutions and practices, the
key inheritance of the Bangladeshi nationalists were an elitist bureau-
cracy and an anny unused to serving civilian authority. Neither of these
two features of the polity was conducive to the growth of democracy, let
alone its deepening or consolidation.
As far as the quality of democracy is concerned, both countries still
face substantial challenges. India has a long way to go, but at least it
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will be building on a record of significant achievement over the last six
decades. Despite Indian democracy's myriad shortcomings, its pros-
pects of further democratic consolidation and enhancement are
substantial. As argued earlier, the dramatic political mobilization that
has taken place over the past several decades makes Indian politics
volatile, unpredictable, and sometimes even violent. And yet these are
merely the symptoms of a moribund sociopolitical order sliding toward
rigor mortis. The demise of this social order, though turbulent, promises
to leave India more egalitarian, open. and democratic. The hitherto dis-
possessed of India are now using the power of the ballot to bring about
fundamental social changes and breach longstanding socioeconomic
barriers.
At another level, the decline of the Congress party and the absence of
a truly nationwide alternative created opportunities for the rise of re-
gional political parties. These parties now wield considerable political
clout across India, even at the national level. As a consequence, India is
now becoming a truly federated polity in which all regions actively
seek the representation of their various interests at the national level.
The logic of Indian economic liberalization will bolster these federat-
ing propensities. States and, more importantly, entrepreneurs no longer
have to look to New Delhi for a plethora of industrial licenses, quotas,
and permits. This is contributing to a form of economic devolution
across India, granting states far greater autonomy in terms of making
economic and investment choices. The days of central planning are
numbered.
These positive trends in Indian democracy are heartening. Two is-
sues, however, continue to dog Indian public life. The first involves
India's flagging commitment to secularism. In recent decades. the
antisecular movement in India has gathered considerable force. This
trend, if it continues to grow, can ring the death knell of Indian democ-
racy. India's cultural. religious, and ethnic heterogeneity necessitates a
secular political order. A democracy that failed to respect some variant
of secularism would consign India's substantial religious minorities to
second-class status or worse. India would then become nothing more
than a majoritarian democracy in which the rights of ethnic and reli-
gious minorities would receive little if any respect. Of course, secularism
does not face an imminent end. A substantial and growing intellectual
class remains committed to the secular enterprise. The Indian judiciary
and much of the Indian press also see the need to maintain a secular
political dispensation. Nevertheless, the ability of unscrupulous politi-
cal entrepreneurs to scapegoat minorities, especially Muslims, for India's
varied social and economic problems remains a profoundly worrisome
trend.
The other threat to the quality of Indian democracy stems from the
willingness of both politicians and citizens to flout the rule of law when
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it appears politically and socially expedient to do so. These breaches
range from the lack of tolerance for slow, awkward, and cumbersome
legal procedures when dealing with the rights of suspected criminals to
the rampant violation of human rights when counterinsurgency opera-
tions are afoot. The disregard for both moral norms and established
legal procedures is highly corrosive of the basic expectations upon
which liberal democracy itself must always rest. Whether or not
countervailing civic institutions and a free press can limit and ulti-
mately end these practices remains an open question.
As serious as India's two key barriers to enhanced democratic quality
may be, they appear paltry next to those that confront Bangladesh. The
Bangladeshi political class has yet to internalize the most basic pre-
cepts of a democratic polity. The principal political parties have not
accepted the necessity of a loyal opposition. They continue to question
electoral outcomes even when there is little doubt about their fairness.
The Bangladeshi military refrains from open intervention in politics,
but JS nevertheless subject to political interference. It has allowed itself
to be used as a political instrument rather than acting as a neutral force
primarily responsible for the defense of the nation's borders.
Bangladesh's inability to protect the rights of women and minorities,
and worse still, state complicity in acts of repression against these
groups further undermines its nascent democracy. Consequently, en-
hancing the quality of democracy in Bangladesh will take considerable
effort. Bangladeshi democracy remains to be improved beyond a super-
ficial state, and to be consolidated.
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